National’s “fiscal plan” came out this afternoon. To no one’s great surprise I guess, we didn’t learn much from it. The big National numbers had been in the Back Pocket Boost package a few weeks ago, combined with the statement from Willis last week that National would get back to an OBEGAL surplus no sooner than Labour was suggesting it would (in PREFU, and in its own fiscal plan). Oh, and they paid some economic consultants to say much the same as Labour got their economic consultants to say: the promises listed added up to less than the future operating allowances the two parties had indicated. As I noted in my post the other day, Labour’s consultants (Infometrics) noted that they hadn’t had much time. But then, having splurged in the previous two budgets, Labour is going into this election with fewer and smaller promises. National’s Castalia is reported to have done a bit more work on a couple of items, but we are still left totally in the dark about the numbers behind the foreign buyers’ tax revenue estimate: neither National’s nor Castalia’s modelling has been released, and there is no official agency estimate to use as a starting point.
The National “plan” is unambitious, depressingly so if you care about fiscal responsibility, or even about easing pressure on monetary policy when (core) inflation – which National has (rightly) been quite strident about – is still coming down slowly if at all.
If you are wondering where that 0.7 per cent of GDP in the title of this post comes from that is how much lower net government debt is estimated (by National themselves) to be lower than the PREFU numbers by 2027/28 – a year so far out it isn’t even in the main PREFU forecast numbers (which run only to 2026/27), and which involves budgets set after the next election, when who knows which constellation of parties will be in office. In the final year of the forecast period – and the final year for which any new government elected next month will set the Budget – the difference is 0.4 per cent of GDP. The differences are derisorily small (and totally swamped by margins of errors around each parties’ plans, let alone uncertainty about denominators (what happens to the economy, and recall that Treasury’s PREFU forecasts were taken by many economists as veering towards the optimistic side)).
Now, I’ve seen Willis and Luxon quoted as saying “ah yes, but no one should believe that Labour can deliver on its plans” (the ones included in the PREFU, including future operating allowances). “Look at their track record, of consistently overshooting those lines in the shifting sands, announced intended future operating allowances.”
And I’d have some sympathy with that line, as no doubt would The Treasury, whose own lightly-coded comments in the PREFU were really rather sceptical (for a government agency in public), highlighting the tough choices and tradeoffs that would be required. At best, the fiscal numbers (recent “cuts” and future operating allowances) behind PREFU are statements of current high-level intent only. Achieving them against the backdrop of ongoing cost pressures – and temporary windfalls from surprise inflation that will not persist – will be challenging to say the least.
But the problem for National with this argument is that they will face all those same pressures, and instead of approaching this election with a serious stance of austerity, emphasising the size and unjustified nature of the current government’s deficits, they are playing much the same game as Labour has over the last year or two, competing to see who can give out the most electorally attractive baubles, and funding those handouts with either the same new distortionary tax Labour is championing (depreciation on non-residential buildings), even as they claim to the party of business and growth, or with a tax (foreign buyers) that is not only unprincipled and inconsistent with much of the rest of their messaging (“supply is what matters”, “foreign investment should be championed), but where the revenue estimates command no confidence whatever beyond the halls of the National Party wing of Parliament.
Now, I for one do have some confidence that National will be better at cutting, or restraining, spending in the next few years. They’ll be cutting stuff the other side did so won’t have the same attachment Labour ministers would have had. But……they need to be better at cutting just to get the same fiscal bottom lines as Labour, because their fiscal plans – bottom lines oh so little from Labour’s – already rely on much larger cuts than the numbers Labour themselves have already talked of (neither side offering any specifics at this point). And for all the talk of spending restraint, and even of a pre-Christmas “mini-budget”. today’s numbers seem to involve no change at all, relative to PREFU, to 2023/24’s spending levels.
And National has its own future fiscal vulnerabilities. Not only will there be pressure to bring down the 39 per cent income tax rate (ruled out only for the first term) but in the Back Pocket Boost package there was this
It isn’t a promise to adjust, but it is a promise to review, and it will be hard to resist the pressure for some adjustment in the 2026 Budget, running into the next election.
It is simply unserious from a party that has banged on – quite reasonably – about Labour fiscal excess in the last few years, and now seems to be slipping (predictably but sadly) into me-too mode, advertising themselves as just a little less bad than the current lot, offering a different set of baubles (ones that seem more electorally appealing at present, but have much the same macro effects).
One telling point (which I owe to Eric Crampton) is to compare what Labour planned to be spending in the medium-term before Covid hit and compare it to what National plans to spend (years down the track) in the medium-term, as (ostensibly) the smaller government party, the party of tough spending discipline. In fact, the one that won’t cut any serious programmes, and only wants to add a few more.
Here, it is only fair to focus on primary spending (National inherits the debt Labour ran up, and it has to be serviced for now). In the HYEFU at the end of 2019 core Crown spending excluding finance costs for 2023/24 was projected (on Labour stated plans) to be 27.1 per cent of GDP. We don’t have detailed tables from National, but there is a line in the plan stating that they intend core Crown spending will be 31 per cent of GDP in 2027/28. Adjust for finance costs (from the PREFU, adjusted for small changes in National’s plan from slightly lower debt late in the period) gives 29 per cent of GDP. That is almost two full percentage points of GDP higher than Labour’s medium-term number.
(Some of that will be because of the ageing population, but that only highlights that National’s plans include not even starting on raising the NZS age for another 20 years. 20 years…….)
Finally, National asserts that their policy will be less inflationary than Labour’s.
That looks fine on paper, but (a) any effect is tiny ($300m), less than 0.1% of GDP, utterly lost in the rounding of any inflation forecasting model, and (b) it ignores quite a lot. That line attributed to the Treasury may be valid in a very general broad-brush sense, but here we need to think about concrete proposals. Thus, even if National’s foreign buyer tax revenue estimates were to be roughly right – and Willis’s latest answers to questions on this point advance things not at all – the money will mostly be coming from income not earned in New Zealand (thus representing no drag on demand) to fund tax cuts pretty much across the board, to a household sector with a high marginal propensity to consume. But reading through the plan, I was struck by a couple of other points. The removal of the regional fuel tax for example (while it will temporarily slightly lower headline, but not core, inflation) puts more money in the hands of Auckland householders, without any immediate identified replacement, and National says they think reserves will enable the Auckland local authorities to keep spending. Net, that is a near-term inflationary effect. They also seem to propose to pay to councils an extra $25000 for each house built above a five year average, funded by discontinuing various other things, one of which is a Kainga Ora land acquisition programme. My point here is not about the merits of the policy, but a policy which stops asset purchases and instead gives councils more spending money is also likely to be inflationary at the margin.
I do not want to overstate this point. All these effects are small, individually and even in total. But there is just no serious basis for National’s claim that their fiscal approach will be less inflationary than Labour’s. And Labour’s added a lot to demand this year, when inflation is still a serious problem.
Finally, for all those – probably mostly on Twitter – who have spent the last few weeks bemoaning my bias (in their eyes) towards either Labour or National, I’m told that at the Mood of the Boardroom event in Auckland this morning both Robertson and Willis were each at pains to suggest that I was no friend or fan of either of them.
And on matters fiscal, they are both right.
