This article attempts to make sense of two opposing viewpoints on the Russo-Ukraine Conflict from an Indian Standpoint, as was reflected in an exchange of views published in the Indian Express, one written by Anastasia Piliavsky and the response written by Subrata Mukherjee. Quite aptly, this exchange personalises an exchange of views between a Ukrainian citizen committed to her country’s cause with an Indian citizen reluctant to support it. As we will see, their exchange summarises most of the common views floated in this regard, and thus their writing makes an ideal anchor for an impartial reader to go about formulating her own view.
Piliavsky makes 9 points, namely that Russia, is not the erstwhile USSR in terms of ideology or economy and not the same country which was such a close ally to India in the 1970s and 80s.; Ukraine is not an American proxy; NATO is not engaged in aggression against Russia; Ukraine is not a Nazi State; Russian-Ukrainians are not needing saving; Russia is attempting to rebuild its historical empire; the Russian military capability was overestimated; Russia has not been a consistent ally to India in recent years and finally that it is not in India’s interests to condone such aggression in the long term.
Mukherjee responds by claiming that NATO is responsible for the present crisis by its past aggression, offensive posture and eastwards expansion; the international legal order has failed Russia; a multipolar world is more stable than a unipolar world; the west was involved in the 2004 pro-democracy movement in Ukraine; Ukraine is a corrupt country with lingering fascist instincts; Ukraine did not implement the 2015 Minsk agreement; Ukraine is responsible for a genocide in Donztsk which the West ignored, the present sanctions are largely a US project; Russia’s loss is likely to be minimal from such sanctions and many countries in the global south have rightly abstained from supporting the western stance in the UN.
Mukherjee also accuses Palevsky of presenting a biased picture and argues that Russia’s position is a response to US-NATO aggression. However, his arguments suffer from a lack of regard of international law and miss several crucial facts on the ground. This article attempts to set the record straight and present a more balanced view.
Even if taken as true at face value, Mukherjee’s claims, do not address most of Palevsky’s 9 arguments. Let’s now deal with the disagreement that actually emerge and set the record straight.
The NATO involvement in Yugoslavia was no doubt controversial and of questionable legality. It lacked UN Security Council approval, as was also correctly pointed out by Mukherjee. However, the fact of the genocide in Yugoslavia was, unlike the one claimed in Ukraine, internationally acknowledged via UNSC Resolution 1199 and NATO’s involvement can be arguably defended as bringing to end to a blood internal conflict. Unlike Ukraine, NATO did not use it as a pretext for territorial expansion. Keeping ‘suspicions’ aside, the way facts stand, a largely democratic and multilateral alliance like NATO has far less of a history and political incentive to engage in naked aggression and territorial annexation, compared to autocratic governments like Russia.
It is also disingenuous to impute that a territorial aggression or invasion may be a justified response to NATO expansion. The two acts are not comparable. Joining an alliance is a perfectly legal act of a sovereign country, also permitted by Chapter VIII the UN Charter of which Russia too is a signatory. Territorial aggression and annexation has been forever renounced as an illegal instrument of state policy as per the charter (Preamble), which forms the bedrock of the current international legal order. Therefore, no country can regard a mere act of joining an alliance by another country as an act justifying a military response. It is the decision of the legitimate government of that country to act as it deems fit for its own security and it is not up to another country to question its motivations or forbid it.
Ukraine has no obligation to stay ‘neutral’ if it feels that it is no longer in its interests to do so. For context, what if China were to one day ‘refuse to tolerate’ India’s growing involvement with the Quad. Would this argument stand? Even from a political standpoint, it is equally likely that it was the Russian aggression in 2008, 2014 and now in 2022, which forced its neighbouring European states to consider joining the alliance, more than any wooing by the west. It is also pertinent to point out that the Russian conception of Ukrainian ‘neutrality’ is also more along the lines of a compliant and puppet regime.
Mukherjee also paints the removal of the Pro-Russian president Viktor Yanukovych in 2013 as an illegal overthrow of government. It is pertinent to point out that his removal from power came about as a result of widespread popular protests, which resulted in him fleeing to Russia, subsequent to which he was removed from power by the Ukrainian Parliament. This is in contrast with the forced regime change which was attempted at gunpoint by Russia at the start of the conflict. President Zelensky was elected with a 73% majority and his election had also recognised by the Russian Government itself. In any case, a domestic regime change is no justified grounds to invade and occupy another country.
The purported Russian apprehension of a possible NATO Naval Base in Crimea is also exaggerated. While Ukraine is certainly entitled to host a foreign base if it so chooses, the strategic reality is that the entry of foreign warships to the black sea is severely restricted by the Montreux convention that regulates the Turkish straits (specifically the number, type and tonnage of ships permitted), and which includes Russia as a party. In any case, it would have been a stretch to jump to that fear in 2014 when Ukraine was still years away from any EU or NATO membership.
With regards to the Russian invasion being a response to an aggressive NATO, it should be noted that NATO defence spending has in fact being dropping since the 1980s, particularly after the end of the cold war. This only saw an uptick after the Russian-Georgian war of 2008, and after the 2015 Russian annexation of Crimea, This is hardly the posture of an aggressive alliance. It is also an overstatement to link NATO’s intervention in Afghanistan and middle east, which were in response to different threats, as being legitimate security considerations for Russia.
Mukherjee also accuses Pilvasky of concealing that Ukraine is one of the most poor and corrupt nations of the world and has fascist elements. If being a model country of model citizens, is a precondition to a peaceful and independent existence, most countries in the world would not meet the bar, including Russia and India.
It is also unfair to blame Kyiv alone for the failure of the Minsk agreement, which was fragile to begin with due to a lack of interest in its enforcement by the major world powers. The Russian-backed separatists have also been held responsible for failing to adhere to the ceasefire. The purported claim of an ongoing genocide against Russians in eastern Ukraine is also far from recognised to be true and has in fact been roundly denied as false by international observer institutions.
Even if one were to assume that Russia is indeed a concerned and bona-fide actor, the country made no attempts to first resort to the established international legal order for recourse or a legitimate response (Chapter VI of the UN Charter) . No attempt at a UN Sanction was sought, nor any recourse to the International Court of Justice under the Genocide Convention was sought, before the military build-up and invasion of Ukraine. In fact, it was Ukraine which subsequently approached the ICJ, which then rejected Russia’s claim of genocide in Donetsk and called for Russia to cease its military action. The manner in which the Russian army has conducted its operations and has been received by the so called ‘oppressed’ people of eastern Ukraine also speaks for itself, in the form of mass graves, torture (confirmed by UN Investigators) and more recently the dubious referendums.
With regards to the efficacy of sanctions, while Russian wheat and gas may continue to find buyers in Asia for now, the sanctions are bound to affect its long-term economic prospects, as the country is cut off from the global markets and is starved of technology and finance. No modern economy can be truly self-substantiable in the global age. Contrary to what Mukherjee claims, Finland and Sweden joining NATO significantly expands the NATO-Russia border, stretches Russian resources, and augments NATO military capability, permanently changing the strategic balance and power calculus in the region.
The western sanctions regime can also not be dismissed as a US project being forced upon the European countries. The US economy itself has suffered as a result of rising oil prices. The EU has been particularly proactive in formulating and imposing multiple packages of sanctions. It is in the interests of the European community itself to deter future Russian aggression and limits its war fighting capability. Mukherjee is however right to point out that several countries of the global south have not taken strong anti-Russian stances so far. However, it would be ill-advised to assume that this would continue, or that it is justified on principle. India’s stance itself has been growing louder and firmer, as more Russian infractions emerging.
How the world reacts to this act of aggression will also have grave long-term ramifications for the international legal order, particular with respect to other zones of potential conflict such as China and Taiwan. In such light, it is well advisable for countries to remember how their interests are tied to continued respect for the present international legal order.
That being said, the Indian response till now has been measured, cautious and based on real politic and strategic autonomy. It is a very real fact that India cannot afford to ignore its dependence on Russia for oil and defence equipment in the short and the medium term, particularly in a post-Covid fragile economy, rising inflation, and after the recent border stand-off and troop mobilisation against China. Piliavsky’s final argument should still give us a moment of pause and consider the line between practicalities and principle.
Do we, one of the original signatories to the UN charter, really want to be held complicit in history to its flagrant violation, an act of naked aggression, invasion and illegal annexation? Showing neutrality against a wrong doer often produces same results as tacit support. History has shown that such neutrality only delays the inevitable, emboldens rather than appeases an aggressor. One need not look beyond the Munich agreement before the second world war for an example. What if the next such aggression is against our own Arunachal or Ladakh? Would we have the same understanding with mere spectators then? Perhaps this country does need to consider if we do believe in certain lines that should never be crossed, and that certain principles are worth defending, no matter the cost.
